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COMMENTARY
RABORN v. DAVIS-PAYCHECK IN EMPLOYEE'S
POSSESSION: A LIMITATION OF THE CURRENT
WAGE EXEMPTION IN TEXAS
Richard E. Flint*
Extensions of credit generally help both the debtor and creditor.
However, one of the results of our credit-based economy is that indi-
viduals are free to make poor economic decisions as well as good ones,
and that they should for the most part, suffer the consequences of
their poor decisions. Legal rules have had a role in ensuring that
debtors are protected from overzealous creditors. On the other hand,
commercial transactions as we know them, can only exist if obliga-
tions of debtors are legally enforceable, such that creditors can use
legal means to enforce and collect valid obligations. The role of gov-
ernment is to set the parameters on the procedures to enforce and
collect these obligations, while at the same time setting a floor of pro-
tected assets or exempt assets so that debtors will not become wards
of the state. Texas has had a long history of "liberal" exemptions as a
matter of public policy to permit debtors to support themselves and
their families. ' This historical heritage has come under attack and the
* Associate Professor of Law, St. Mary's Law School, B.A., Ph.D., J.D., University of
Texas.
1. McKnight, Protection of the Family Home from Seizure by Creditors: The Source and
Evolution of a Legal Principle, 86 S.W. HIST. Q. 364, 375 (1983). This liberality began in the
area of homestead and has since spread to personal property. Professor McKnight in examin-
ing the sources of modern homestead law noted: "[T]he perception of Texas as a refuge for
debtors was a consequence of several factors: Texas' primitive judicial system, the difficulty of
finding debtors there, and most particularly, the reluctance of local judges to enforce foreign
debts against fellow colonists." Id. The first constitution of Texas following statehood pro-
vided for a homestead exempt from forced sale for debts. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 22 (1845).
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status of debtors vis a vis creditors recently has changed drastically.
The floodgates once opened may be hard to close.
Following the rendition of a judgment for $22,761.35 in unpaid at-
torney's fees, Burta Rhoads Raborn sought relief under the Texas
turnover statute2 to satisfy the unpaid judgment. After an evidentiary
hearing the district court ordered the judgment debtor "to endorse
and turn over to a court-appointed receiver 'all cash, checks, or other
negotiable instruments,'. . . received from his employer."'3 The re-
ceiver was to distribute a portion of the debtor's income to the credi-
tor and return the remainder to the debtor "so that he could meet his
necessary living expenses."4 The debtor also was ordered to continue
Personal property exemptions, unknown at common law, were part of the Spanish heritage
and carried over as part of the fundamental law of the republic. 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF
TEXAS 125-26 (1898). The present constitution gives the legislature the mandatory duty to
protect from forced sale a certain portion of the personal property of citizens of Texas. TEX.
CONST. art. XVI, § 49. Even during the time of the republic an individual could not be impris-
oned because he could not pay his debts. TEX. CONST. Declaration of Rights, Twelfth (1836).
2. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.002 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1990). This
statute provides in part:
(a) A judgment creditor is entitled to aid from a court of appropriate jurisdiction
through injunction or other means in order to reach property to obtain satisfaction on the
judgment if the judgment debtor owns property, including present of future rights to
property, that:
(1) cannot readily be attached or levied on by ordinary legal process; and
(2) is not exempt from attachment, execution, or seizure for the satisfaction of
liabilities.
(b) The court may:
(1) order the judgment debtor to turn over nonexempt property that is in the
debtor's possession or is subject to the debtor's control ...
(3) appoint a receiver with the authority to take possession of the nonexempt
property, sell it, and pay the proceeds to the judgment creditor to the extent required to
satisfy the judgment.
(c) The court may enforce the order by contempt proceedings or by other appropriate
means in the event of refusal or disobedience.
Id. In 1989, the legislature added a new subsection which places a limitation on the court's
turnover powers. That subsection states:
(f) A court may not enter or enforce an order under this section that requires the
turnover of the proceeds of, or the disbursement of, property exempt under any statute,
including section 42.0021 of the Property Code. This subsection does not apply to the
enforcement of a child support obligation or a judgment for past due child support.
Id. § 31.002(f).
3. Davis v. Raborn, 754 S.W.2d 481, 482 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988), rev'd,
33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 249 (Feb. 21, 1990).
4. Raborn v. Davis, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 249, 249 (Feb. 21, 1990).
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this turnover until the judgment was satisfied.' The court of appeals
reversed the trial court's order holding that the turnover order was
invalid because it required the turnover of future wages at a time
when the wages had not been paid to and received by the debtor, and
therefore were exempt. 6 On February 21, 1990, the Texas Supreme
Court reversed the appellate court's decision and held that an order
directing a judgment debtor to turn over his future paychecks does
not violate the Texas constitutional prohibition against garnishment.7
The Texas Supreme Court noted that as the turnover order directed
the debtor, not a third party, to turn over current and future property
there was no garnishment.' By way of dictum, the court then stated
that "because a paycheck in the hands of the judgment debtor is no
longer 'current wages' ";9 the proceeding, even if characterized as a
5. Davis, 754 S.W.2d at 482.
6. Id. at 483-84. The court of appeals had no trouble determining that a paycheck lost its
exempt status when the wage earner was paid by his employer. However, the court held that
the trial court was not empowered to order a judgment debtor to turn over exempt property-
those wages to be paid and received in the future. "The potential consequence of an order
allowing a creditor to reach property that is currently exempt will weaken and destroy our
constitutional guarantees and render such protection useless." Id. at 483. Chief Justice Evans
dissented, noting that the trial court's order did not violate the constitutional or statutory
provisions because "wages are no longer current when the employee receives a paycheck from
the employer." Id. at 484 (Evans, C.J., dissenting).
7. Raborn v. Davis, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 249, 249 (Feb. 21, 1990). This holding conflicts
with the Texas Constitution which provides that "[n]o current wages for personal service shall
ever be subject to garnishment, except for the enforcement of court-ordered child support
payments." TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 28 (1876, amended 1982). In the court of appeals, the
debtor had argued that his paycheck represented "current wages" and that an order requiring
him to turn it over to a receiver was tantamount to garnishment in violation of the constitu-
tional protection. Davis v. Raborn, 754 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1988), rev'd, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 249 (Feb. 21, 1990); see also TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 63.004 (Vernon 1986)(prohibiting garnishment of current wages). Garnishment in
Texas involves three separate entities-the judgment creditor, the judgment debtor, and the
garnishee (the individual who is alleged to owe the judgment debtor money or holds the judg-
ment debtor's property).
8. Raborn, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 249-50. Garnishment is a statutory proceeding that
"necessarily involves a third party who has possession of the debtor's property or owes the
debtor money." Id. at 249; see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 63.001-.005
(Vernon 1986).
9. Raborn, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 250. The Texas Supreme Court merely said that there
was precedent for the proposition that "wages cease to be current wages at least for purposes of
the exemption statutes, upon their being paid to a wage earner and coming under his control."
Id. No statutory references were cited. In Texas, however, in addition to the constitutional
prohibition against garnishment of current wages, another statutory scheme protects current
wages from seizure in satisfaction of debt. Section 42.001 of the Texas Property Code provides
"[e]ligible personal property . . . is exempt from attachment, execution, and seizure for the
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garnishment, would not violate the constitutional prohibition against
garnishment of current wages.' ° Finally, the Texas Supreme Court
stated that a trial court has the authority to order a judgment debtor
to turnover future paychecks to a receiver upon receipt by the
debtor." The cursory opinion of the Texas Supreme Court fails, in
satisfaction of debts, except for encumbrances properly fixed on the property." TEX. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 42.001 (Vernon 1984). Section 42.002 includes "current wages for personal
services" among property which is eligible for the exemption. Id. § 42.002. These two sec-
tions were enacted by the legislature in response to the constitutional mandate to enact legisla-
tion to protect by law from forced sale a certain portion of the personal property of individuals.
TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 49. As current wages in the hands of the employer are protected
from garnishment by the prohibitions found in the constitution and related statute, the above
statutory prohibition against seizure of current wages appears to be meaningless unless it is
interpreted to mean that the protection for current wages continues in some manner following
their leaving the employer's possession. Cf Gaddy v. First Nat'l Bank, 115 Tex. 393, 400, 283
S.W.2d 472, 474-75 (1926). For specific language, see infra note 50.
10. Raborn, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 250. If the court had found the paycheck to represent
current wages, it was clear that even the protection granted against garnishment of current
wages was broad enough to protect the debtor against other types of seizure. See City of
Houston v. Nelius, 693 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ
dism'd)(prohibiting withholding of employee's wages by his employer to pay employer's judg-
ment against employee). Furthermore, a 1943 attorney general opinion stated:
It can make no difference that the bill authorizes the creditor to reach by law the wages
of his debtor "save and except garnishment." In what other method could it be reached
than by garnishment? The bill does not undertake to provide another method to accom-
plish this end, but if it were to do so, and should provide a remedy and call it "im-
pounding", "distraint", or what not, such a bill would nevertheless violate the very spirit
and purpose of the Constitution. Especially mentioning "garnishment" in the Constitu-
tion is no limitation whatsoever upon the obvious purpose to exempt all current wages for
personal service from the exaction of creditors, and would forbid legislative enactments
setting up a proceeding under another name, the effect of which would be to subject the
current wages of [sic] personal service to an impounding for debt.
Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. 0-5148 (1943)(proposed law sought to authorize seizure of current
wages above stated dollar amount, except by garnishment), Furthermore, since a court's turn-
over order can only reach nonexempt property, if the Texas Supreme Court had determined
that a paycheck represented current wages and, therefore, was exempt under the turnover
statute, a discussion of the garnishment statute would have been unnecessary. As noted above,
this was the precise reason the court of appeals had reversed the trial court's order seeking a
turnover of the future paychecks. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
11. Raborn, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 250. To hold otherwise the court argued would force
the judgment creditor to obtain a separate turnover order for each pay period. Id. The court
stated that such an order would not be an assignment of wages, because it merely required the
judgment debtor to turnover nonexempt property, if and when, it came into his possession. Id.
This holding contradicts the prohibition against the assignment of future wages. McKneely v.
Armstrong, 109 Tex. 363, 366-67, 210 S.W. 192, 193 (1919). A voluntary or involuntary as-
signment of future wages when permitted under law also might be subject to other statutory
restraints. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 23.01-.33 (Vernon 1987)(assignment for
creditors); id. §§ 24.001-.013 (Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act).
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this author's opinion, to interpret properly the term "current wages"
found in the Texas Constitution's prohibition against the garnishment
of "current wages" from seizure for debts. The majority opinion also
fails to give any consideration to the serious ramifications of its deci-
sion on judgment debtors.'I The purposes of this observation are to
critically analyze the development of the present interpretation given
to the term "current wages" and to suggest a meaningful alternative
to that interpretation in light of the clear mandates in the Texas Con-
stitution and legislative enactments.
Prior to Raborn there was no doubt that cash in and of itself in the
hands of the judgment debtor was nonexempt in Texas. 3 Further-
more, it was clear that funds in the possession of the employer for past
due wages of an employee were not exempt and were subject to gar-
nishment.' 4 The unresolved issue was whether a paycheck represent-
ing wages for the current pay period in the employee's hands had lost
its exempt status. Although no prior Texas Supreme Court decision
had addressed this issue specifically, the case of Bell v. Indian Live-
Stock Co. '" is cited frequently for this proposition.' 6 In Bell the court
12. See Raborn v. Davis, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 249, 250-52 (Feb. 21, 1990)(Mauzy & Cook,
J.J., concurring separately). The concurring opinions discussed one of the more pressing issues
left in the wake of the court's decision, that being the possibility of being held in contempt for
failing to comply with a court's turnover order. Justice Mauzy, joined by Justices Ray, Hight-
ower, and Doggett, stated that enforcement of the turnover order by imprisonment for con-
tempt clearly would violate the constitutional prohibition of imprisonment for debt. Raborn,
33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 250 (Mauzy, J., concurring); see also TEX. CONST. art. I, § 18. Justice
Cook, on the other hand, wrote that such a result-imprisonment-is a necessary corollary of
the court's decision. Raborn, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 251-52 (Cook, J., concurring). Justice
Cook stated:
I believe that we should also consider the broad effect of stripping a court of its power to
enforce an order that we have already declared valid and constitutional. Such a position
would threaten the rights of creditors to satisfy judgments. More important, that position
would undermine the power of the courts to enforce their legal orders.
Id. at 252 (Cook, J., concurring). None of the opinions focused on the additional leverage that
this decision will give the judgment creditor. This increased leverage will have the unin-
tended-or perhaps expected-result of increasing the number of bankruptcy filings in the
state.
13. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002 (Vernon 1984)(cash itself is not listed among
list of personal property exemptions although current wages for personal services are listed).
Prior to the adoption of the turnover statute there was no effective way to reach cash or
paychecks in the debtor's possession. See infra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
14. See Bell v. Indian Live-Stock Co., 11 S.W. 344, 346 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1889, opin-
ion adopted).
15. Id.
16. See Highland Park State Bank v. Salazar, 555 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); King v. Floyd, 538 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
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held that earned wages which were retained by the employer lost their
exempt status, and the employer was subject to a writ of garnish-
ment.1 7 The logic of the case is clear--current wages lose their ex-
empt status when they are past due. The wages earned but unpaid for
the current pay period were exempt and not subject to garnishment
according to the court.18 The court described the underlying purpose
of the current exemption as follows:
We prefer to attribute such legislation to the more humane and philan-
thropic purpose of protecting to the employee his current earnings to
meet and defray the current expenses of his living, that he may enjoy a
credit to the extent of his current earnings, and not be forced into a
condition of abject dependence and want.19
From this beginning the assault on the citadel began.
The apparent fountainhead of the proposition that wages for cur-
rent personal services once paid to the employee lose their exempt
status is the case of Sutherland v. Young.2° That case involved a gar-
nishment action on a bank on the same day following the deposit of a
payroll check.2' The Sutherland court, relying on the earlier Bell de-
cision and the case of Davidson v. F.H. Logeman Chair Co.,2 con-
ton [lst dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Sutherland v. Young, 292 S.W. 581, 582 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1927, no writ). But cf Gaddy v. First Nat'l Bank, 283 S.W. 277, 279 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1923), aff'd by certified question, 115 Tex. 393, 397, 283 S.W. 472, 473
(1926)(workmen's compensation recovery in employee's segregated bank account retains ex-
emption and exemption under workmen's compensation statute not limited to "current" com-
pensation). Although the Gaddy court did not need to distinguish the future, current and past
compensation, the courts' reasoning would apply to protect current wages in the employee's
hands. See infra note 50.
17. Bell, 11 S.W. at 346. The court did not address the issue of what happened after the
wages were paid to the employee.
18. Id. The court stated "the wages were payable monthly, and were exempt for the
month current at the time of the service of the writ, but the exemption ceased to apply when
the wages became past due." Id. (emphasis added).
19. Id.
20. 292 S.W. 581, 582-83 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1927, no writ).
21. Id. at 582. The facts of the case show that on April 1, 1926, the judgment debtor
received the check representing his previous month salary. He deposited the check in the bank
on the same day, and the judgment creditor caused the bank to be served with a writ of gar-
nishment. Id. at 582.
22. 41 S.W. 824, 825 (Tex. Civ. App. 1987, no writ). In Davidson the court had stated:
Whenever the wages become subject to the control of the employee, and he voluntarily
leaves them with his employer, or collects and deposits them with someone else, he has
robbed them of their character as current wages, and the protection extended to them by
constitution and statute is lost.
Id. The Sutherland court also cited Lee v. Emerson-Brantingham Implement Co., 222 S.W.
[Vol. 21:939
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cluded that the money deposited was no longer current wages and
could be garnished.23 All three of these cases involved garnishment
proceedings against third parties holding funds that had been left or
deposited voluntarily by the employee and which represented moneys
for past wages for personal services. Of course, once the paycheck
comes into the hands of the employee at the end of the pay period, the
question of current wage's exemption from garnishment becomes
moot.24 None of these three cases dealt with the status of cash or
paychecks in the hands of the employee received for the current pay
period.
The reason that this issue was neither addressed nor answered in
earlier cases was because judgment creditors arguably had no effective
remedy to reach the debtor's paycheck prior to the enactment of the
turnover statute in 1979. The check, a negotiable instrument, was
considered beyond the reach of legal writs.25 Furthermore, the judg-
ment creditor was unable to invoke the equitable injunctive and con-
tempt powers of a court to compel the judgment debtor to produce
nonexempt property in the form of cash or otherwise. 26 The turnover
statute merged legal and equitable postjudgment collection remedies
and was specifically aimed at assisting judgment creditors in reaching
nonexempt property that could not be levied upon readily by other
legal process.27
283, 284 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1920, no writ). Sutherland, 292 S.W. at 582. The Lee court
held that earned wages involuntarily left with the employer did not lose their exempt status
and were not subject to garnishment. Lee, 222 S.W. at 284.
23. Sutherland, 292 S.W. at 582.
24. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 63.001-.005 (Vernon 1986). On this
point the Raborn court correctly interpreted the statutes and the constitution. 33 Tex. Sup. Ct.
J. at 249. This fact in and of itself, however, does not mean that the current wages in the form
of the paycheck are not exempt from attachment, execution, and other forms of seizure for the
satisfaction of debts when in the possession of the employee. In fact, the Texas Property Code
states that current wages are exempt and such exemption is not dependent on the form in
which those current wages exist, i.e., cash or paycheck. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 42.001,
42.002(8) (Vernon 1984). Nothing in the statute indicates that current wages lose their current
status when they are transferred from the employer to the employee. Current wages are still
current wages. Whenever current compensation for personal services in the hands of the em-
ployee is clearly identifiable as such, it should be considered current wages because that is the
primary purpose of the exemption statute. Unless and until such are deposited or converted to
other property the exemption should remain.
25. See Price v. Brady, 21 Tex. 614, 616-17 (1858).
26. See, e.g., White Sewing-Mach. Co. v. Atkeson, 75 Tex. 330, 333-34, 12 S.W. 812, 813
(1889); Noyes & Fish v. Brown, 75 Tex. 458, 462, 13 S.W. 36, 37 (1889).
27. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 31.002(a)(1), (2) (Vernon 1986).
1990]
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The statute changed creditor collection practices in Texas. The ef-
fect of the turnover statute was to require the burden of production of
property which was subject to execution (nonexempt) to be placed on
the debtor instead of on the creditor. 21 In the abstract, there is noth-
ing fundamentally wrong with the statute's shifting of this burden to
the judgment debtor where it rightfully belongs. The existence of
such a remedy shifts the economic leverage of collection of a debt to
the creditor. The real problem is that this procedure reaches the only
source of livelihood for most honest debtors and their families-the
paycheck representing current wages. 29  The turnover statute gives
the diligent creditor a reasonable remedy to obtain the property of the
judgment debtor. However, if the statute forces the wage-earner to
relinquish a paycheck already received and representing wages for the
immediately preceding pay period and all future paychecks, it violates
the spirit of the exemption statutes. In fact, such a court order would
deprive the employee of his exemption for current wages. Such a nar-
row, technical construction would defeat the very purposes of the ex-
emption statutes.
In the last several years, however, several courts relying on Suther-
land and its progeny have recognized the possibility that a court
could order the turnover of a paycheck in the hands of an employee.30
28. See generally Hittner, Texas Post Judgment Turnover and Receivership Statutes, 45
TEX. B.J. 417 (1982)(citing SENATE COMM. OF JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. S.B.
965, 66th Leg. (1979)).
29. The turnover statute vests substantial discretion in the hands of a trial court. A court
may order the judgment debtor to turn over nonexempt property. The purpose of the statute
was to "put a reasonable remedy in the hands of a diligent judgment creditor, subject to super-
vision of the Court." See id. (citing from the Texas House and Senate Committee Reports).
Thus, as in Raborn the court may permit the judgment debtor a portion of the turned over
paycheck for his own support and that of his family. One commentator states that the court
has no discretion in ordering the turnover of the paycheck once its nonexempt status is deter-
mined. See Toben & Toben, Using Turnover Relief to Reach the Nonexempt Paycheck, 40
BAYLOR L. REV. 195, 195 (1988). The authors served as co-counsel for the judgment debtor
in the Barlow case where the court after determining that the paycheck was not exempt did not
order its turnover. See Barlow v. Lane, 745 S.W.2d 451, 453-54 (Tex. App.-Waco 1988, writ
denied)(appellate coart said such action was not abuse of discretion).
30. See Buttles v. Navarro, 766 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989,
n.w.h.)(refusal to order turnover of paycheck not an abuse of discretion); Barlow v. Lane, 745
S.W.2d 451, 453 (Tex. App.-Waco 1988, writ denied)(refusal to order turnover of paycheck
not an abuse of discretion); see also Davis v. Raborn, 754 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1988)(turnover of future paychecks prohibited), rev'd, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 249
(Feb. 21, 1990). But see Salem v. American Bank of Commerce, 717 S.W.2d 948, 948-49 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1986, no writ)(turnover of future paychecks permitted).
[Vol. 21:939
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Each of these recent decisions initially determined that a paycheck in
the hands of the employee was not current wages. Absolutely no con-
sideration was given in any of these opinions to the significant public
policies encompassed in the exemption statutes of Texas. Further-
more, none of these opinions even attempted to construe the term
"current wages" liberally to include the paycheck in the employee's
hands.3" In Maumus v. Lyons,32 however, the court, after rejecting
the precedential value of these earlier decisions, held "that wages for
services performed during the pay period immediately preceding pay-
ment to the employee, whether such wages [were] paid in cash, by
check or other means, [were] current wages and exempt property
under the purview of the turnover statute."33 The Maumus court
based its holding on their interpretation of the intent of the drafters of
the Texas Constitution and statutes as well as on the public policy
evidenced in those writings. It was against this legal backdrop that
the Texas Supreme Court entered the stage and rendered its Raborn
decision.
Although not writing on an entirely clean slate, it is clear that the
Texas Supreme Court could have followed the Maumus decision.
Perhaps the court was mislead by an expressed concern that if the
term "current wages" were defined to include more than those wage
obligations yet owed by an employer to an employee, the judgment
debtor would be able to accumulate an unlimited amount of exempt
cash.34 Such a concern, however, would have been misplaced. The
31. See Cobbs v. Coleman, 14 Tex. 594 (1855). Since before the war between the states, it
has been the practice of courts to broadly and liberally construe the meaning of words con-
tained in remedial statutes. Id. The exemption statutes are uniformly considered to be reme-
dial statutes and the courts in Texas have always given them the most comprehensive and
liberal construction possible. See Green v. Raymond, 58 Tex. 80, 83 (1882). What good is the
current wage exemption given by statute if such exemption ends the very instant that the
wages are received by the employee? Although current wages may not be garnished from the
employer until they are passed due or retained voluntarily, how is the employee to take advan-
tage of the exemption if he can never freely receive them in their exempt status. It is interest-
ing to note that the same day the Raborn decision was issued the Texas Supreme Court issued
a highly technical decision construing contractual language. In that case the Texas Supreme
Court noted that although words contained in an instrument should be used as controlling
guides, that punctuation marks can also aid in the construction of the document. Criswell v.
European Crossroads Shopping Center, Ltd., 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 252, 253 (Feb. 21, 1990). But
the Court did not construe the plain language of the Texas Constitution to protect Davis from
the turnover of his paycheck which was in effect garnishment.
32. 771 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, n.w.h.).
33. Id. at 195.
34. See Toben & Toben, Using Turnover Relief to Reach the Nonexempt Paycheck, 40
1990]
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term "current wages" has a known and readily identifiable meaning. 35
Furthermore, Bell and its progeny already had determined the ac-
cumulation issue by holding that past due wages accumulated by the
employer were not current wages.3 6 Thus, it is logical to expand that
principle to deny the exemption to accumulated paychecks in the em-
ployee's possession. A court could look to the specific facts of each
employee-employer relationship and make a determination of which
paycheck in the employee's possession represents wages for personal
services performed for the preceding pay period and grant the limited
exemption. This approach is consistent with the intent of the consti-
tution.3 7 However, the Texas Supreme Court failed to even consider
the policies sought to be served by the current wage exemption.
The court also failed to consider the interaction between the effects
of its decision and title III of the Consumer Credit Protection Act.3 8
BAYLOR L. REV. 208, 209 (1988). The authors argue that the liberal exemption of real and
personal property in Texas would pale before such unlimited accumulations. From this naive
statement the authors then state "these observations lead to the conclusion that a paycheck,
once in the hands of a judgment debtor, is no longer exempt and is subject to the reach of a
turnover order." Id. at 209. The Texas Supreme Court in the Raborn case cited to this law
review article. Raborn, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 249, n. 1.
35. Bell v. Indian Live-Stock Co., II S.W. 344, 346 (1889). In the Bell case an employee
was receiving $200 a month for his services, but drew on the money only when he needed it.
At the time that the employer was garnished there was a credit of over $600 in the employee's
account. Id. The court relied on common non-legal dictionaries to define the words current
and wages. In Webster the court found the word "current" meant "running or moving rap-
idly; now passing or present in its progress, as, a current month or year." Id. Bouvier, another
dictionary used by the court, defined "current" as "a term used to express present time, cur-
rent month, etc." Id. Without referring to the source the court stated that wages "are the
compensation given to a hired person for services." Id. "Current wages" are those "paid
periodically, or from time to time as the services are rendered or the work is performed; more
particularly, wages for the current period, hence not including such as are past-due or de-
ferred." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 345 (5th ed. 1979). In Dempsey v. McKennell, the court
stated that current wages are "such compensation for personal services as are to be paid peri-
odically, or from time to time, as the services are rendered." 23 S.W. 525, 525 (Tex. Civ. App.
1893, no writ).
36. See supra notes 14-23 and accompanying text.
37. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 28, interp. commentary (Vernon 1955). "[I]t was better
that some creditor go unpaid than to take away from the debtor and his family the current
wages essential to preserve the family from want and make them independent." Id. The com-
mentary notes that the opportunity for self-support is important to prevent the individual from
becoming a burden upon the public. Id.
38. Consumer Credit Protection Act, Title III-Restrictions on Garnishment, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1671 (1989). The report of the House Banking and Currency Committee concluded that
there was a substantial direct impact on the various states' garnishment laws upon commerce
and upon personal bankruptcies. H.R. REP. No. 1040, House Committee on Banking and
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This federal statute places a ceiling of twenty-five percent on the
amount of an employee's disposable earnings 39 that is subject to gar-
nishment," with the exception that the ceiling may be raised as high
as sixty-five percent if the garnishment is to enforce family support
orders.4" The statute has been interpreted broadly to accomplish the
purpose of Congress, and it applies to all proceedings in aid of execu-
tion as well as to attachment proceedings. 2
In a situation where it was alleged that the statute did not protect a
paycheck because it had lost its identity as earnings, a federal court
interpreting the Consumer Protection Act found that such an argu-
ment was specious and was not in keeping with the spirit of the stat-
ute. 3 The court noted that it would be relatively simple for a sheriff
to ascertain when an employer issues payroll checks and avoid the
restriction of the Act by simply waiting and levying on the debtor's
wages after issuance." It is this author's opinion that the turnover of
the paycheck in the hands of the employee clearly violates the spirit of
the federal law, if not its very terms.4'5 Although this issue apparently
Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
1962, 1977-79. The report concluded its discussion of title III with the following statement:
The limitations on the garnishment of wages adopted by your committee, while permit-
ting the continued orderly payment of consumer debts, will relieve countless honest debt-
ors driven by economic desperation from plunging into bankruptcy in order to preserve
their employment and insure a continued means of support for themselves and their
families.
Id. at 1979.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 1672(b) (1989). "Disposable earnings" is defined as that part of an indi-
vidual's gross compensation for personal services that remains after deduction of amounts
required by law to be withheld. Id.
40. Id. § 1672(c). "Garnishment" is defined as "any legal or equitable procedure through
which the earnings of any individual are required to be withheld for payment of debt. Id.
41. Id. § 1673.
42. Hodgson v. Hamilton Mun. Court, 349 F. Supp. 1125, 1139 (S.D. Ohio 1972); see
also Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 651 (1974). In Kokoszka, the Supreme Court noted
that "there is every indication that Congress, in an effort to avoid the necessity of bankruptcy,
sought to regulate garnishment in its usual sense as a levy on periodic payments of compensa-
tion needed to support the wage earner and his family on a week-to-week, month-to-month
basis." Id.
43. See Hodgson v. Christopher, 365 F. Supp. 583, 587 (D.N.D. 1973). The district court
held that insofar as the North Dakota statute permitting levy on a judgment debtor's paycheck
operated to deprive the employee debtor of all his earnings, it comes with restrictions of the
Act. Id. at 585-86.
44. Id. at 587; see also Kokoszka, 417 U.S. at 651 ("earnings" means periodic payments or
compensation).
45. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). Time honored principles of statutory
construction dictate that a court should give prominence to the Congressional findings in-
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was not raised, the Texas Supreme Court could have relied upon this
federal authority in shaping its definition of the term "current wages."
As a result of the Texas Supreme Court's decision a Texas judg-
ment debtor is faced with the choice of continuing to work almost
entirely for the benefit his judgment creditor, of being held in con-
tempt for failing to comply with a court's turnover order,46 or of filing
bankruptcy47 to avoid the overwhelming burden imposed upon him
by the court's decision. Given the rich history of exemptions in Texas
beginning with the Constitution of 184548 and given the liberal con-
struction which courts since 1855 49have given to the exemption stat-
utes, it seems inconceivable that a Texas court could impose this
burdensome decision upon its citizens. This opinion has placed the
judgment debtor on the horns of a dilemma. It is hoped that upon
intelligent reflection on the purposes of the current wages exemption
that the Texas Supreme Court will reconsider its decision, or in the
alternative that an enlightened legislature will remedy this decision by
protecting cash or paychecks reflecting payment for current wages
while in the hands of the judgment debtor.5 0 A time for immediate
volved. Id. Congress found among other things that "the great disparities among the laws of
the several states relating to garnishment have, in effect, destroyed the uniformity of the bank-
ruptcy laws and frustrated the purposes thereof in many areas of the country." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1671(a)(3) (1989).
46. See Raborn v. Davis, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 249, 250 (Feb. 21, 1990). The court's opin-
ion noted that it did not reach the issue of whether the state statute violated the constitutional
prohibition against imprisonment of debtors [TEX. CONST. art. I, § 18 (1955)], because Davis
had neither been imprisoned nor held in contempt. Id. For a discussion of the concurring
opinions which did address this issue, see supra note 12.
47. See II U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1), (2) (1989). If the debtor were to file a Chapter 13 bank-
ruptcy proceeding he could propose a plan subject to approval by a bankruptcy court dedicat-
ing only his projected disposable income to the repayment of debts. Id. As a result an
unsecured judgment creditor could receive only a mere fraction of his claim. While under
Chapter 7 the debtor would not be required to turnover any of his future income to the credi-
tors, as only his nonexempt assets would be subject to creditor claims. Id. §§ 541, 726 (1989).
Under the federal exemption scheme, if elected, the debtor would be able to exempt cash or
paychecks in his possession, or earned but unpaid wages or salary, limited to $400 plus up to
$3,750 of his unused interest, not to exceed $7,500 in his homestead. Id. § 522(d)(1), (5).
48. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 22 (1845).
49. Cobbs v. Coleman, 14 Tex. 594, 599 (1855); Gaddy v. First Nat'l Bank, 115 Tex. 393,
399, 283 S.W. 472, 474 (1926).
50. See TEX. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3(b) (Vernon Supp. 1990)(workmen's com-
pensation recovery exemption). The Texas workmen's compensation statute provides the fol-
lowing exemption:
All compensation allowed under the succeeding sections herein shall be exempt from
garnishment, attachment, judgment and all other suits or claims, and no such right of
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decision is at hand.
action and no such compensation and no part thereof or of either shall be assignable
except as otherwise herein provided, and any attempt to assign same shall be void.
Id. The Texas Supreme Court held that the exemption provided by the workmen's compensa-
tion statute protected workmen's compensation in the hands of the employee and in a segre-
gated bank account. Gaddy, 115 Tex. 393, 400, 283 S.W.2d at 474-75. The court quoted the
following language in Gaddy:
If the exemption shall obtain only until the employee receives the compensation, it
would never benefit him. He cannot use it, because nonassignable, until he actually col-
lects it. Then, if at that very minute, it is subject to debts and legal writs, there would not
be a minute when he could call it his own. He really would have no exemption.... If the
fund be subject to garnishment the instant it reaches his possession or that of his bank,
then it could be taken away before the employee could pay any debts he might owe or buy
necessaries and supplies for himself.
Id. at 397-98, 283 S.W.2d at 473 (quoting Judge Powell's withdrawn Commission of Appeals
opinion interpreting TEX. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5246-3 (Vernon Supp. 1918)). When the
legislature revised the civil statutes, article 8306, § 3 replaced article 5246-3. TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (Vernon 1967 & Supp. 1990). Therefore, if the legislature defines
current wages with reference to the intent of the constitutional exemption and adopts similar
language to protect current wages, the Supreme Court should recognize the exemption.

